Behaviorism
Behaviorism was a movement in psychology and philosophy that emphasized the outward behavioral aspects of thought and dismissed the inward experiential, and sometimes the inner procedural, aspects as well; a movement harking back to the methodological proposals of John B. Watson, who coined the name. Watson’s 1912 manifesto proposed abandoning Introspectionist attempts to make
consciousness a subject of experimental investigation to focus instead on
behavioral manifestations of intelligence. B. F. Skinner later hardened behaviorist strictures to exclude inner physiological processes along with inward experiences as items of legitimate psychological concern. Consequently, the successful “cognitive revolution” of the nineteen sixties styled itself a revolt against behaviorism even though the
computational processes cognitivism hypothesized would be public and objective — not the sort of
private subjective processes Watson banned. Consequently (and ironically), would-be-scientific champions of consciousness now indict cognitivism for
its “behavioristic” neglect of inward experience.
The enduring philosophical interest of behaviorism concerns this
methodological challenge to the scientific
bona fides of consciousness (on behalf of empiricism) and, connectedly (in accord with materialism), its challenge to the supposed
metaphysical inwardness, or subjectivity, of thought. Although behaviorism as an avowed movement may have few remaining advocates, various practices and trends in psychology and philosophy may still usefully be styled “behavioristic”. As long as experimental rigor in psychology is held to require “operationalization” of variables, behaviorism’s methodological mark remains. Recent attempts to revive doctrines of “ontological subjectivity” (Searle 1992) in philosophy and bring “consciousness research” under the aegis of Cognitive Science (see Horgan 1994) point up the continuing relevance of behaviorism’s metaphysical and methodological challenges.